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I should like to begin my remarks 
this evening with a quotation 
from a famous telegram sent by 
George F. Kennan from Moscow 
in 1946. Although he was refer-
ring to the policies to be adopted 
by the United States towards the 
Soviet Union, this remark still seems 
particularly apt some sixty-two 
years later. In concluding what had 
proved to be a very lengthy com-
ment on the nature and attitudes 
of the Stalinist state, he said:
Finally we must have courage 
and self-confi dence to cling to our 
own methods and conceptions 
of human society. After all, the 
greatest danger that can befall us 
in coping with this problem of 
Soviet Communism is that we shall 
allow ourselves to become like 
those with whom we are coping.1
The comment seems relevant 
today for, if we replace ‘Soviet Com-
munism’ by ‘Islamic terrorism’, the 
statement captures very precisely 
the great fl aw behind the ‘War on 
Terror’ or, as we are now to call it, 
the ‘Long War.’ In essence, Ameri-
can policy towards the Middle East 
and North Africa during this dec-
ade – and to a much lesser extent 
European policy, too – has been 
dominated by a belief in an existen-
tial and systemic threat emanating 
from the region which can only be 
countered, because of its immediacy 
and severity, by abandoning much 
of the principle and practice of 
diplomatic engagement in the past. 
Instead, the brutal application of 
military force and diplomatic threat, 
together with cultural and political 
arrogance, has become the princi-
ple that has guided our response, 
2	 Policy	Report
a principle subsumed within the 
catchphrase of the ‘War on Terror’.
Today, as we approach the end 
of the second Bush administration, 
with a new administration in the 
offing next January, and as the ‘credit 
crunch’ further undermines what has 
been the world’s sole hyper-power 
for the past two decades, there is 
a general view that, somehow, the 
‘War on Terror’ is also coming to 
an end and that a new dispensation 
will inform our policies towards 
the Middle East and North Africa. I 
am not convinced that this is so, at 
least in terms of the foreign policy 
platforms of the candidates for 
presidential office. Indeed, I even 
wonder if such a dispensation is pos-
sible or conceivable in the intellectual 
and policy planning environment 
that has been created since Septem-
ber 11, 2001, if not long before. 
And, even if it were possible, I 
wonder how the West – Europe and 
the United States – could meaning-
fully engage with the Arab World, 
Iran and Afghanistan in ways that 
would counter the negative and dam-
aging initiatives undertaken as part 
of the ‘War on Terror’ over the last 
eight years. After all, to adopt new 
policies would mean understanding 
where the failures lie in the past and 
that, in part, depends on being able 
to articulate what they were. Yet, one 
of the most striking features of recent 
years has been how the vocabulary 
of international politics has changed 
and how, in the midst of their defeat 
in Iraq, the neo-conservatives and 
assertive nationalists who have 
dominated the policy scene, have 
succeeded in imposing a new politi-
cal vocabulary upon us. And that, 
in turn, limits debate and obscures 
key issues so that it is question-
able whether it is still possible to 
counter the hegemonic discourse 
that informs the ‘War on Terror’.
If this is true, then we face a 
profound problem of identifying 
what the objective situation really is. 
Instead we run the danger that we 
shall continue to construct an image 
that resonates to our prejudices 
and preferences and that this will, 
in turn, reinforce that hegemonic 
discourse, generating a world of 
perpetual confrontation. Individu-
als, of course, are not necessarily 
trapped in this ‘cloud of unknowing’ 
but the mass media and mainstream 
politicians increasingly seem to have 
bought the neo-conservative pack-
age such that the external relations 
of Western states with the Middle 
East and North Africa are dominated 
by a securitised vision of threat that 
has achieved the status of a myth. 
In such circumstances, any hope of 
moving beyond the ‘War on Terror’ 
is itself a mythological undertak-
ing! Yet, if this is my position, I owe 
it to you to examine these issues 
in greater detail, to see whether or 
not my pessimism is justified and 
what the implications of this will 
be for the short-to-medium term.
The American vision
We should, perhaps, recall that the 
first Bush administration began its 
period in office with an assumption 
that its primary concerns would be 
with domestic policy. Throughout the 
electoral campaign, the president-
to-be had consistently played down 
the importance of foreign policy, 
particularly with the Middle East, 
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apart from the ritual obeisance to 
Israel and a personalised attack on 
Iraq. Even after he entered office, 
the new president showed little 
sense of urgency over the issues 
that had so exercised the Clinton 
administration in its dying days, 
particularly that of trans-national 
violence and international terrorism.
It was only with the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 that this policy 
vacuum was suddenly filled. The 
incidents were to prove to be the 
catalyst that also resolved a latent 
conflict within the new administra-
tion, whereby the neo-conservatives 
within it – many of them former 
democrats from pre-Reagan days 
who had bemoaned the lack of 
muscularity in American foreign 
policy in projecting national inter-
est and the democratic project 
abroad – were able to suddenly gain 
prominence alongside the old asser-
tive nationalists of the Republican 
Party. With startling speed, the two 
groups fashioned a coherent policy 
based on the ideas of democratic 
peace and pre-emptive intervention 
as a means of removing the canker 
of violence from the Middle East. 
In addition, as part of the process 
of ensuring domestic support in the 
confusion created by the attacks, 
they mobilised the concept proposed 
by Leo Strauss of the ‘noble myth’, 
exploiting the concept of Islam-based 
trans-national terrorism as a systemic 
and existential threat to the Ameri-
can ideal, in a manner reminiscent 
of communism and the Cold War.
It was against this intellectual 
background that the attack on 
Afghanistan was executed and the 
subsequent invasion of Iraq was to 
be justified. As part of this process, 
not only was the regime of Saddam 
Hussain erroneously and deliberately 
alleged to be involved in supporting 
Islamic terrorism, but Israel was rei-
fied as the democratic model that the 
Middle East and North Africa would 
eventually have to emulate. In reality, 
of course, the Bush administration 
soon forgot about democratic peace, 
opting instead for regional security, 
whatever the political complexions 
of the regimes that guaranteed it. 
Even more important, perhaps, the 
‘noble myth’ of a systemic and exis-
tential threat from politicised Islam 
became the justification for the con-
struction of the ‘War on Terror’, itself 
profoundly pre-emptive in nature 
with its demands for military and 
security cooperation from other states. 
In the Mediterranean, in particular, 
few regimes objected as the pressure 
on them for political reform ebbed 
away, even if they feared the outcome 
of the American intervention in Iraq. 
Even Saudi Arabia soon overcame 
American antagonism engendered 
by the fact that the majority of those 
‘The “noble myth” of a systemic 
and existential threat from 
politicised Islam became the 
justification for the construction 
of the “War on Terror”’
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responsible for the attacks had come 
from the Kingdom whose Wahhabist 
religion was seen, quite erroneously, 
to have been responsible for the 
extremism that they had imbued. 
Domestically, of course, its counter-
part was the suspension of individual 
rights and liberties – through 
the feverish search for ‘Home-
land security’ and, subsequently, 
through Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo 
Bay and ‘special rendition’. 
What has been striking, to me at 
least, has been the way in which these 
new principles governing American 
security and foreign policy have 
continued vitality in the United States 
today, despite the failures in Iraq and 
the growing crisis with Iran. Indeed, 
they have even been imported into 
Europe too, although given Europe’s 
belief in itself as a ‘normative power’, 
they have been couched somewhat 
differently. Here we worry – with 
good reason, in view of the attacks on 
Madrid and London, given the fact 
that the Middle East and North Africa 
are part of our southern periphery – 
about Islamised violence imported 
through migration and political asy-
lum or through the contacts between 
the continent’s Muslim minority 
communities and their countries-of-
origin. European policy towards the 
Mediterranean has, as a result, been 
profoundly securitised and the Euro-
pean tradition of critical engagement 
has been, in effect, abandoned. As 
with Washington, European capitals 
soon abandoned any dream of engen-
dering democratic governance for 
the sake of supporting regimes that 
ensured security, whatever the price.
Yet, along with this change in 
diplomatic practice and international 
engagement came the introduction 
of a new diplomatic and political 
vocabulary, based on novel assump-
tions about the nature of the ‘threat’. 
Its effects were particularly notable in 
the Anglo-American discourse where 
the idea of al-Qa’ida as a massive 
informal network of focussed hostil-
ity, dreaming of challenging Western 
values and overthrowing them to 
install a universal caliphate captured 
the popular imagination, significant 
portions of the commentariat and 
the conservative political elites as 
well. For Frank Gaffney, for example 
– admittedly on the far right but not 
without considerable support – quite 
apart from the violent extremists, 
the Islamic world is now engaged in 
what he calls ‘soft jihad’ to impose 
‘shari’a’ on the Western world. Tony 
Blair repeatedly warned of the threat 
to ‘our values and our way-of-life’ 
from Islamic extremism, conveniently 
ignoring that the discourse of even 
extremist jihad is explicitly defensive 
in nature in terms of strategy, even 
if – like the Bush administration 
and its supporters – it also believes 
in pre-emptive action as a tactic.
Even if politicians decry the idea 
that Islam in some politicised form 
or other is in itself the threat, media 
reporting of the endless arrests and 
trials for terrorism reinforce the 
implicit message that it is, that it 
is the driver for the violence that 
forces us to accept restrictions on 
our liberties and the excesses of 
security and securitised legisla-
tion. The same is true in the United 
States, even though there has been 
no incident of political violence 
linked to Islam since 2001. Demotic 
discourse has, in short, been securi-
tised too and these linguistic habits 
spill over into mainstream political 
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discourse as well. Once that has 
happened, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to establish a meaningful 
dialogue or discourse over the real 
quantum and nature of threat sim-
ply because the political vocabulary 
has been impoverished by what 
has become a new and hegemonic 
debate over security and little else.
In fact, this is not entirely new. 
Indeed, it could be argued that this 
has been part of Western discursive 
traditions reaching back to the First 
World War and even beyond. Noble 
myths, after all, have always been 
abundant, both in promoting fear and 
in reinforcing superiority in both the 
European colonial and the American 
foreign policy traditions – whether 
in terms of ‘lesser breeds without the 
law’ or ‘manifest destiny’ or whether 
it involves fear of the unknown, such 
as the ‘great communist conspiracy’ 
or the ‘missile gap’. They develop 
and respond to real threats, even if 
they deliberately exaggerate them 
for the sake of guaranteeing public 
support for government, or even to 
discipline the public into such sup-
port. And ‘international terrorism’ 
alongside the ‘Soviet threat’ has played 
an indispensable role in this respect.
As David Rapoport has pointed 
out2, international terrorism, itself the 
product of the development of mass 
communications in the nineteenth 
century, has been with us for the 
past 125 years. There have been four 
successive waves, he argues, each 
informed by a universalistic ideol-
ogy and each lasting for about forty 
years – anarchism, nationalism and 
national liberation, the ‘New Left’ 
and now religious extremism. Jeffrey 
Kaplan3 has added a fifth variant 
that can co-exist with the others; a 
chiliastic, inwardly-directed vision of 
remaking tribal and national socie-
ties through violence, beginning with 
the Khmer Rouge and including the 
Lords Resistance Army in Uganda 
and the Janjaweed in Sudan. And 
there is no doubt that they have had 
their effects on Western diplomatic 
paradigms. Here is President Theod-
ore Roosevelt in 1901, for example:
Anarchy is a crime against the whole 
human race and all mankind should 
band together against the Anarchist. 
His crimes should be made a crime 
against the law of nations…declared 
by treaties among all civilized powers.
For our purposes, ironically 
enough, the particular noble myth 
that now informs the ‘War on Ter-
ror’ and the supposed Islamist threat 
from the Middle East and North 
Africa finds its origins in the way in 
which President Woodrow Wilson 
shaped the Versailles peace treaty 
at the end of the First World War. 
Alongside self-determination, demo-
cratic governance, with its extension 
‘democratic peace’ first made an 
implicit appearance. Even though 
his intervention in the pragmatic, 
self-interested victors’ vengeance 
that characterised the French and 
British approach in the negotiations 
is universally seen as a statement 
about disinterested engagement in 
establishing a world order, it had 
about it the whiff of the Monroe 
Doctrine as well as a self-righteous 
sense of the ordering of the world!
This, of course, highlighted the 
essentially moral assumptions that 
have always been behind American 
foreign policy, despite its profoundly 
realist nature and usual practice. 
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It is, in some sense, the obverse of 
domestic policy which, in essence, is 
governed by the Constitution and the 
assumptions about liberty that sur-
round it – John Winthrop’s ‘city upon 
the hill’ recast by Ronald Reagan as 
the famous ‘shining city upon the 
hill.’ And it was this that the neo-
conservative movement originally 
picked up when former New York 
Trotskyists allied with Jacksonian 
Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This moral sense was given explicit 
form by Francis Fukuyama in his 
famous 1989 article, ‘The end of his-
tory?’, even if he has now renounced 
his former allegiance to the neo-
conservatives themselves. Its realist 
parallel – the domain of the assertive 
nationalists such as Donald Rumsfeld 
and Dick Cheney – was captured by 
Samuel Huntington four years later 
in his warning of the ‘Clash of Civili-
sations’ – a perfect paradigm for the 
perpetual existential Islamist threat.
It is this discourse, too, that Brit-
ain, in particular, has adopted. It 
reinforces the populist demotic vari-
ant of the threat to ‘our way-of-life’, 
creating that ‘cloud of unknowing’ 
and impoverished vocabulary that 
now informs debate throughout 
society and the media and render-
ing any objective analysis of the 
dialectic between the West and the 
Islamic world intensely difficult, if 
not impossible, in policy terms. In 
the United States, perhaps the most 
important manifestation of this 
emerges from the programmes of the 
two presidential candidates and their 
vice-presidential nominees in the 
run-up to the elections on November 
4, 2008. The most surprising feature 
of the programmes they have pro-
posed is that they differ so little. 
Both unconditionally support 
Israel, thereby ignoring the most 
crucial of all problems inside the 
Middle East dimension. The same is 
true of their vice-presidential part-
ners, although for Sarah Palin this 
is probably far more a matter of her 
Christian evangelism than of con-
sidered policy analysis. Over Iraq, in 
reality, the distinctions between the 
positions of Barak Obama and John 
McCain are minimal – one proposes 
a partial but substantial withdrawal 
over sixteen months and the other 
a withdrawal in terms of prevailing 
conditions. Both demand that Iran 
be brought to heel and neither is 
prepared to renounce the military 
option, although John McCain is 
more willing to use it than is Barak 
Obama who offers engagement 
with Iran instead. And, over Islamic 
terrorism neither offers more than a 
continuation of the confrontations of 
the past, with, in the case of Barak 
Obama, a promise of far greater 
military engagement in Afghanistan.
It is thus difficult to see that any 
meaningful change to the ‘War on 
Terror’ can be expected, especially 
since neither has proposed any real 
change in the domestic arena to the 
provisions for homeland security. 
Ironically enough, however, even 
though we may no longer be able to 
conceive of an alternative way for-
ward, the effectiveness of the ‘War on 
Terror’ is also widely questioned. A 
BBC poll4, published on September 
29, 2008 and based on information 
gathered from more than 24,000 
people in 23 countries between July 
and September reveals that 29 per 
cent of respondents believe that it 
has had no effect and a further 30 per 
cent felt that it had strengthened al-
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Qa’ida. Almost half the respondents 
(49 per cent) felt that neither side in 
the war was winning, whilst 22 per 
cent – 34 per cent in the United States 
– believed that the United States had 
gained the upper hand but only 10 
per cent thought that its adversary 
was winning. In Egypt, 60 per cent of 
respondents approved of al-Qa’ida 
and in Pakistan – another key state 
in the war – only 19 per cent of 
respondents had a negative view of 
the movement. The poll was hardly 
a ringing endorsement of the policy!
Indeed, the evidence of 
recent years would seem to 
back up this conclusion: 
• Despite the apparent victory 
against al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Sunni 
Islamist violence is rife in Mosul 
and now appears to be creeping 
back into Baghdad and its sur-
rounding regions, being restrained 
only by the Sahwa movement – 
former al-Qa’ida supporters whose 
loyalty to the Iraqi government 
is contingent upon integration 
into the Iraqi security forces – 
something Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki is determined to avoid! 
• In Afghanistan, NATO and Ameri-
can forces face an ever widening 
circle of Taliban violence – of 
a kind akin to Jeffrey Kaplan’s 
‘Fifth Wave’ – rather than the 
virtuous circle of reconstruction 
they had anticipated. NATO 
commanders now anticipate a 
ten-year-long commitment and 
the United States intends to boost 
its force levels by 30,000 men. 
• Now the failure to destroy the 
al-Qa’ida leadership has led to 
direct intervention in Pakistan, 
thus alienating Pakistani pub-
lic opinion which has become 
ferociously anti-American. 
Confidentially, Western military 
leaders are speaking of the col-
lapse of Peshawar to Taliban 
forces by the end of this year. 
• In Europe, the frequency with 
which terrorist plots are uncov-
ered accelerates but the threat 
does not apparently diminish, 
being fed by alienation and frus-
tration amongst isolated minority 
communities facing economic 
and social discrimination. 
• In North Africa, phoenix-like, the 
Algerian civil war seems to be 
on the edge of being rekindled 
amidst anger over rising con-
sumer costs and governmental 
incompetence. Morocco faces 
similar dangers as IMF- and 
Western-led liberalisation fails to 
generate trickle-down prosperity.
• Only, perhaps, in South-East Asia 
could there have been said to have 
been some success but, even there, 
the situation in Thailand and the 
Philippines remains uncertain. 
This recital of failure, of course, 
is not admitted in Western capitals 
as being a consequence of misplaced 
policy. Instead the indigenous threat 
is mythologised and exaggerated into 
a global and malevolent conspiracy 
that challenges Enlightenment val-
ues and Western rationalism. Yet a 
large part of this failure resides in 
our inability to generate an objective 
and realistic analysis of the problems 
that we face and an unawareness 
of the history that informs them. 
Instead we persist in securitising 
the symptoms and militarising our 
responses to them, whilst resolutely 
ignoring the underlying causes. 
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Yet, overall, it seems that the ‘War 
on Terror’ has demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of military means in 
dealing with international terrorism, 
in whatever form it may manifest 
itself. And there is little evidence 
that our leaders are prepared or 
are able to abandon its principles 
and strategies, or that the publics to 
whom they have to resonate would 
wish them to do so, largely because 
of the ‘noble myths’ that have now 
become orthodox explanations within 
our hegemonic security discourse.
Alternatives
Yet, as Senator Obama has 
demanded, in the leitmotiv to his cam-
paign, the American people – and, by 
extension, people everywhere, cer-
tainly in Europe – need ‘change’. So, 
let us suppose that the new president, 
whoever he may be, actually does 
question the utility and the morality 
of the ‘War on Terror’ and begins to 
clear the Augean stables of interna-
tional affairs from the detritus left by 
his predecessor. Of course, he will 
not be able to ignore the manifesta-
tions of violence that now confront 
the United States throughout the 
Middle East, so we must assume that, 
at some level, the military strategies 
already in place continue. However, 
we might reasonably assume that 
the means by which they are ful-
filled alter, involving far more local 
input and far less reliance on brute 
force. In the wider field of a strategy 
against trans-national violence, the 
incumbent may well decide to learn 
from Europe’s far longer experience 
with terrorism and national libera-
tion, relying instead on intelligence 
and effective policing rather than on 
military force. And, inevitably, the 
appalling trappings of deliberate 
abuse of individual rights and liber-
ties articulated through the power 
of the state by the Bush administra-
tion will have to be swept away.
All of this, however, only addresses 
the symptoms of the crisis that the 
‘War-on-Terror’ was supposed to 
address, none of it deals with the 
causes – many of which long predate 
the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
A new president, if he is to create a 
meaningful engagement with the Mid-
dle East and North Africa, will also 
have to design policies to address such 
causes, even if domestic imperatives 
will tie his hands over many of them. 
The first requirement he will face will 
be to shrink trans-national violence 
down from the terrifying proportions 
into which it has been conflated by 
the impoverished discourse of the 
neo-conservatives and their allies to 
something which responds to its true 
dimensions in international affairs. 
Yet, given the impoverishment of 
the political discourse over the past 
decade and the widespread consen-
sus it has achieved, it is questionable 
whether or not he will be able to build 
‘Reining in on “homeland 
security” might reduce 
domestic hysteria and improve 
the social environment instead’
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a domestic constituency for reversing 
the ‘noble myths’ of the past, although 
the degree of disbelief currently 
evinced by Americans suggests that 
he might be kicking at an open door! 
Once again, it is a question of 
degree and proportion for it is 
undeniable that threats linked to 
trans-national violence do exist. But 
then, as David Rapoport has shown 
us, they always have and it is the 
duty of government to both counter 
them and ensure that public concern 
is based on objective evaluation of 
the danger. Although Europe faces 
a special and specific problem over 
the anger now entrenched within its 
minority communities which does 
represent a real threat to public order 
and social stability, this is not true of 
the United States. Perhaps reining in 
on ‘homeland security’ might reduce 
domestic hysteria and improve the 
social environment instead. De-
securitising the foreign policy process 
might also play a very useful part 
in this, both within the West and in 
the Middle East and North Africa. 
In reality, of course, the true 
domain for trans-national and 
national violence lies inside the Mus-
lim world itself, particularly in the 
Middle East and North Africa. And 
there, the role of trans-national vio-
lence is miniscule compared with the 
threat of national violence stimulated 
by illegitimate, authoritarian govern-
ment and economic deprivation. 
Repression and deprivation of the 
burgeoning populations of the region 
have proved to be two of the main 
drivers for the violence of recent years 
and here a new American president 
could do much to reduce their effect. 
It is a great pity that Western attempts 
at modifying the practices of regional 
governments in the past have been so 
contaminated by their confusion with 
more immediate Western concerns, 
leading to the widespread convic-
tion there of Western connivance in 
indigenous repression. Condoleeza 
Rice’s promises of Western support 
for democracy, rather than stabil-
ity, in June 2005 rang hollow in the 
face of failures of such support in 
Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt.
Yet the United States will have 
to demonstrate, as will Europe in 
its more diminished domain of the 
Mediterranean, that it is sincere and 
disinterested in its attempts to encour-
age democratic governance – in forms 
that are consonant with local political 
cultures – as part of the process of roll-
ing back terrorism. And, as part of that 
process, it will have to address the eco-
nomic agenda too. Over the past year, 
Middle Eastern and North African 
anger has grown in direct proportion 
to increases in energy costs and in 
the price of food. Neither is solely the 
responsibility of the West, of course, 
but Western speculators and the pro-
duction of bio-fuels have played their 
part, a part profoundly expanded by 
the trade liberalisation agenda pushed 
by both the United States and the 
European Union in the face of the fail-
ure of the World Trade Organisation’s 
Doha Round of trade negotiations in 
recent years. And beyond that, too, 
there have been the failed policies of 
economic restructuring pushed for the 
past three decades by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
There has been, as Cecil Woodham-
Smith5 wrote of the Irish famine, 
a ‘terrible want of kindness’ over 
Western prescriptions for economic 
revival in the region, quite apart from 
the fact that they have not worked. 
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These generic changes in policy 
approaches towards the region will, 
however, take place in very differ-
ent circumstances from those that 
obtained at the beginning of this dec-
ade. Then the United States did enjoy 
the ‘unit-polar moment’ and it was 
possible to talk of hegemonic stability 
created by the world’s sole hyper-
power, even if the New World Order 
enunciated by President Bush’s father 
in January 1991 had proved to be a 
chimera. Now, however, the world 
looks very different. Not only has the 
United States profoundly weakened 
itself by its engagement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, not to mention sub-
sidiary commitments in Somalia, the 
Sahara and the Sahel through its new 
AFRICOM military command which 
is responsible for African security and 
for countering terrorist infiltration 
there, or in the Caucasus. It is also 
significantly weakened by the global 
energy crisis and, latterly by the 
financial crisis too. In other words, 
its ability to project and sustain force 
is significantly and increasingly 
impaired and multi-polarity is set to 
replace the uni-polarity of the past.
In the Middle East, this means that 
it cannot ensure that, for instance, 
the Gulf remains an American lake, 
as it has been ever since 1945 or at 
least since the British left in 1971, 
even if its engagement with Israel can 
continue unchecked. This has been a 
key part of American global strategy 
for the past sixty years because of 
concerns over the global oil market 
and threats to its operations or to 
the sanctity over the sea lanes that 
access it. Now other powers, led 
by China but with India not too far 
behind, challenge its hegemonic 
position there. Although the Chi-
nese challenge is not geopolitical in 
nature – yet – the implicit struggle 
for access to and eventually control 
of energy resources there will have 
geopolitical implications, as the 
tussle in the United Nations Security 
Council over policy towards Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions has already shown. 
And Russia, too, is anxious to flex 
its muscles in what it still regards as 
its ‘Near Abroad’, strengthened as 
it has been by the reassertion of its 
Trans-Caucasus sphere-of-influence.
And the emergence of alternative 
hegemony necessarily dilutes the 
ability of the West to enforce its own 
agenda of engagement with regimes 
in the region, in the hope of defusing 
popular anger by improving govern-
ance and prosperity. Whatever the 
overt political ambitions of com-
petitors to the West might be, they 
necessarily offer, in an eerie echo of 
the Cold War, alternative patrons 
for regional governments. Thus one 
part of Iranian truculence over its 
nuclear programme lies in the fact 
that it is an observer-member of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion, alongside Russia and China 
– China’s ‘Eastern NATO’ as it has 
been called. Algeria, Libya and Qatar, 
too, are still mulling over Russian 
plans for a ‘Gas OPEC’, rather than 
integration with Europe as their 
major, indeed, sole energy partner. 
Western influence, in consequence, 
is far more attenuated than it was 
and it will be correspondingly more 
difficult to address the problems of 
trans-national violence that the ‘War 
on Terror’ was supposed to cure.
Yet, apart from these themes of 
Grand Strategy, as Edward Luttwak 
has described them, there is a much 
more pervasive issue of Western 
	 Beyond	‘The	War	on	Terror’:	Prospects	for	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	 11
credibility within the sphere of public 
opinion that will be crucial to any 
attempt to counter trans-national 
threat, whether through the ‘War on 
Terror’ or some subsequent strategy, 
whatever it may be. We have care-
lessly squandered our moral capital 
in the Middle East and North Africa 
since the end of the Cold War, with 
injudicious policies towards all the 
major crises in the region. We have 
forgotten that the Muslim world can 
also make moral judgements and that 
one of its crowning social principles, 
enshrined in Islamic doctrine, is 
social justice. Instead, from the sanc-
tions regime against Iraq in the 1990s 
to acquiescence in Israel’s rubbishing 
of the Oslo Accords, Western powers 
have fed Muslim perceptions of dou-
ble standards in international affairs.
The reason why this is so serious is 
that it has created a moral and social 
environment in which, even if the 
violent excesses of movements such 
as al-Qa’ida are increasingly vilified 
as un-and anti-Islamic by local popu-
lations, its analysis of the situation, 
paradoxically, receives a sympathetic 
hearing. Hence the 60 per cent of 
Egyptians who take a positive view of 
al-Qa’ida; they do not admire its bru-
tality but they recognise the accuracy 
of its message that the ‘near enemy’ 
– corrupt authoritarian regimes - can 
only exist because of the constant 
support and reinforcement it receives 
from the ‘far enemy’ – the West, 
particularly the United States6. Nor 
is the message particularly new; after 
all Ayatollah Khomeini considered 
the United States the ‘Great Satan’ 
and European states its ‘Little Satan’ 
accomplices. The difference today is 
that al-Qa’ida’s view is reinforced by 
that sense of a Western betrayal of the 
core principle of social justice too. And 
thus the demotic Middle East becomes 
Mao Test-Tung’s sea in which guerril-
las (or terrorists) can swim like fish.
Conversely, of course, such a 
social and political environment 
always made the task confronting 
those engaged in the ‘War on Terror’ 
virtually impossible, a situation that 
was compounded by the preference 
for military force over the use of 
intelligence and the civil power. Our 
new incumbent in the White House, 
therefore, faces a Herculean task in 
redirecting and reorienting America’s 
policies within the Middle Eastern 
and North African region, in simple 
terms of policy design, let alone the 
challenge of competing hegemony 
and of the destructive consequences 
of the neo-conservative hegemonic 
discourse that pervades the media 
and public debate. A brief look at the 
details of what would be involved 
demonstrates just how massive a 
task it would be and will, no doubt, 
further feed my scepticism that 
either Senator McCain or Senator 
Obama would seriously attempt it.
There are three, perhaps four, 
long-standing crises in relations 
between the Middle East and North 
Africa and the West that have acted 
as festering sores for decades and 
that have undermined all of the 
systemic initiatives that have been 
undertaken – such as the Euro-Med-
iterranean Partnership, European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the US-
Middle East Partnership Initiative or 
even the Middle East Peace Process 
– and that now feed trans-national 
violence. They are the Arab-Israeli 
dispute and the associated Israeli-
Palestinian conflict; the aftermath of 
the situation in Iraq; the policies of 
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containment of Iran; and, perhaps, 
the impending failure in Afghani-
stan. Together they have generated 
such popular anger throughout 
the region that the widening circle 
of trans-national violence should 
not come as a surprise to Western 
policy-makers. Yet all of them, in 
theory, are easy to address if the will 
is there, for none of them present 
major political or moral dilemmas.
At the top of the list must come the 
conflicts involving Israel. They should 
have been resolved in the 1990s and 
would have been, had it not been for 
the intransigence of the Netanyahu 
government from 1996 onwards, cou-
pled with the political weakness of 
Yasir Arafat. European powers played 
little part in bringing effective pres-
sure to bear, not least because they 
deferred to American judgement and 
the United States, in the aftermath 
of the 1967 war, allowed ideological 
myth to replace balanced rational 
judgement so that successive Ameri-
can presidents have been increasingly 
incapable of altering the fundamental 
drift towards Israeli imperatives over 
the past forty years. Despite being 
the first administration to recognise 
that Palestinians were entitled to a 
state, the Bush administration did 
much less than its predecessors to try 
to encourage an equitable solution.
Indeed, it compounded the situa-
tion by its attitude towards the 2006 
Palestinian elections, an attitude 
adopted to its shame by the European 
Union on the spurious grounds of 
counter-terrorism strategy, a position 
that was strengthened after Hamas’s 
take-over of Gaza in June last year. In 
the same year, it supported Israel’s 
unsuccessful war against Hizbul-
lah in Lebanon and, more recently, 
has contemplated supporting Israel 
in its threat to attack Iran over its 
nuclear programme – something 
it did do over the alleged Syrian 
nuclear site just over a year ago. 
Luckily, Mr Bush seems to have 
decided not to crown his presi-
dency by initiating such an attack!
None of these acts could be seen 
as being supportive of a peace proc-
ess and all of them have prejudiced 
the possibility of compromise being 
acceptable to the majority of Palestin-
ians, whatever the weak leadership 
of Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank 
may promise. Any incoming admin-
istration will have to pressure Israel 
into stopping its settlement activi-
ties, accepting some compromise 
on Jerusalem and modifying its ban 
on refugee return if it really wishes 
to end the conflict. In view of the 
dominant discourse in Washington, 
it is virtually inconceivable that this 
can occur or could even be conceived 
as a project. But if it is not effectively 
addressed, it will continue to be a 
driver for trans-national violence from 
those informal actors in the region 
for whom no other mechanism exists 
to express their opposition. Indeed, 
they have now even made a virtue 
out of necessity in the arguments 
they deploy to justify their actions.
Next comes the vexed issue of 
Iran in which American irrationality 
towards the Islamic revolution over 
thirty years has rendered the negotia-
tions led by the European Union in 
the ‘three plus three’ group over the 
nuclear issue far more complex. It is 
further compounded by the complex 
and largely unrecognised American 
relationship with Iran over Iraq, 
where Iranian acquiescence with 
American intentions is essential if 
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they are to be realised. Yet the United 
States continues – with some justi-
fication – to consider Iran its major 
challenge in the region, perceiving 
– with far less justification – a ‘Shi’a 
arc of extremism’ arching across the 
Middle East to Lebanon in an attempt 
to frustrate its objectives. The irony 
is that, despite the bellicose and 
often hostile rhetoric that emerges 
from Iran, many elements within 
the complex and opaque leadership 
in Teheran would happily embrace 
dialogue with the United States. It 
is something that Barak Obama has 
promised and that Iran-watchers such 
as Kenneth Pollak would encourage 
as a means of breaking the political 
logjam both within Iran and in terms 
of its external relationships.7 Although 
Sunni extremists reject Shi’ism, the 
political example of Iran remains 
a powerful symbol throughout the 
Middle East of successful resistance to 
American hegemony, as does its links 
with Syria, Hamas and Hizbullah.
The final issue that the next occu-
pant of the White House will have to 
address, if he wishes to redress Amer-
ica’s parlous situation in the Middle 
East and North Africa, is, of course, the 
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
both cases it will be a matter of tidying 
up situations that went badly wrong 
many years ago. In both cases, the 
departure of Western forces will draw 
much of the poison, although indirect 
support for both countries and now 
for Pakistan may have to continue for 
many years. In both cases it is a matter 
of recognising the errors of strategy 
and tactics that generated the violence, 
along with the highly questionable 
justifications originally adduced to 
legitimise pre-emptive intervention. 
In essence the United States needs to 
return to the fundamental principles 
of the United Nations – something no 
American politician instinctively sup-
ports – and respect state sovereignty 
as a basic principle of international 
relations, despite the exceptional 
circumstances provided for in Chap-
ter 7 of the United Nations Charter 
and in the more recent doctrine of 
‘Responsibility to Protect’. That alone 
would do much to heal the dam-
age caused during recent years.
It might help to recall that the 
original Afghani resistance to the 
Soviet invasion in 1979 arose from 
conservative village elders and nota-
bles, alongside the religious radicals in 
Kabul, and that it was only prolonged 
resistance that generated a concept of 
resistance based on the politicised tra-
ditions of Islam revived as an ideology 
of violence. And that, in turn, led to 
the globalised vision of al-Qa’ida, now 
the preferred brand of the myriad of 
autonomous groups expressing their 
grievances against regional govern-
ments and their Western backers. 
Those particularised grievances had 
fed, too, on the longstanding resent-
ments generated by the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Western hostility towards 
Iraq after its defeat in Kuwait in 1990, 
‘The United States needs to 
return to the fundamental 
principles of the United Nations’
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and Iran after its Islamic revolution. 
The problem is that now the Islamised 
ideology of violence has taken flight 
and exists independently of its causes 
– and that is the measure of the chal-
lenge that faces any administration 
which wishes to transform its relations 
with the Middle East and North Africa.
It seems to me highly unlikely that 
either of the two presidential candi-
dates will want to engage with such a 
problem or will be able to appreciate 
the enormous gulf of distrust and dis-
like that has given content to Samuel 
Huntington’s mischievous vision of 
political predestination. Instead, the 
‘War on Terror’ will, in some modified 
and perhaps truncated form, continue 
to define Western relations with the 
Middle East and North Africa. I must, 
therefore, maintain my scepticism 
over its impending demise or of its 
replacement by policies designed to 
mend the damage it has caused. I 
fear that it will continue until it may 
be impossible to reverse, as Ameri-
can influence continues to diminish. 
Hopefully, this will not continue 
to the point described by George 
Kennan in his 1947 article in Foreign 
Affairs when he cited Thomas Mann:
Observing that human institutions 
often show the greatest outward 
brilliance at a moment when inner 
decay is in reality furthest advanced, 
he compared the Buddenbrook family 
in the days of its greatest glamour to 
one of those stars whose light shines 
most brightly on this world when in 
reality it has long ceased to exist.8
The problem is, however, that 
some such outcome is no longer 
beyond contemplation if current 
attitudes and policies are maintained.
Notes
1	 ‘The	Long	Telegram’:	861.00/2-2246	
Telegram;	The	Charge	in	the	Soviet	
Union	(Kennan)	to	the	Secretary-of-State,	
Moscow	February	22,	1946.
2	 Rapoport	D.C.	(2004),	‘The	four	waves	of	
modern	terrorism’,	Cronin	A.	and	Ludes	J.	
(2004)	(eds),	Attacking terrorism: elements 
of a grand strategy,	Georgetown	Univer-
sity	Press	(Washington	DC)
3	 Kaplan	J.	(2008),	‘Terrorism’s	fifth	wave:	
a	theory,	a	conundrum	and	a	dilemma,’	
Perspectives on Terrorism II,	2	(January	
2008)
4	 http://news_bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/
americas/7638566.stm	
5	 Woodham-Smith	C.	(1964),	The Great 
Hunger: Ireland 1845-1849.	Signet	(New	
York)
6	 The	terms	are	taken	from	Muhammad	
Faraj’s	The absent obligation	–	a	reference	
to	the	role	of	jihad	as	the	sixth	pillar	of	
Islam.
7	 Kenneth	Pollak,	‘The	future	of	Iran’,	lec-
ture,	September	26,	2008	at	the	Foreign	
Policy	Research	Institute	in	Philadelphia.
8	 ‘X’,	‘The	sources	of	Soviet	conduct’,	
Foreign Affairs,	July	1947
	 Beyond	‘The	War	on	Terror’:	Prospects	for	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	 15
The	Global	Policy	Institute	was	created	in	August	2006	as	a	
Research	Institute	of	London	Metropolitan	University.	It	brings	
together	academics	from	the	social	sciences	and	business	dis-
ciplines	to	analyse	the	dynamics	of	globalisation	and	formulate	
policy	solutions.	The	Institute’s	research	and	consultancy	will	
be	of	direct	practical	use	to	decision-makers,	policy	formation,	
business	users	and	civil	society	groups,	and	it	will	offer	partner-
ships	within	and	beyond	the	academic	community.
The Global Policy Institute
London	Metropolitan	University
31	Jewry	Street
London	EC3N	2EY
United	Kingdom
	
Tel	+44 (0)20 7320 1355
Fax	+44 (0)20 7320 3018
Email	office@global-policy.com
Web	www.global-policy.com
www.global-policy.com
